Category Archives: Defense, Including Radar, Missiles and EW

This blog posts news about the Defense industry, including links to industry news and articles, and announcements of continuing education for professionals who are working in the radar, missiles and EW profession.

Report – Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress

ATLANTIC OCEAN (Oct. 20, 2015) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS The Sullivans (DDG 68) fires a Standard Missile 2 (SM-2) during a live-fire test of the ship's Aegis weapons system Oct. 20, 2015. The Sullivans is participating in At Sea Demonstration 2015 (ASD 15), an exercise testing network interoperability between NATO and allied forces. (U.S. Navy photo by Information Specialist 1st Class Steven Martel/Released) 151020-N-XX999-001 Join the conversation: http://www.navy.mil/viewGallery.asp http://www.facebook.com/USNavy http://www.twitter.com/USNavy http://navylive.dodlive.mil http://pinterest.com https://plus.google.com

Issues for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include the following:

1.  required numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships versus available numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships;
2.  a proposed reduction in planned procurement quantities of SM-3 Block IB and IIA missiles under the FY2018 budget submission, compared to planned quantities under the FY2017 budget submission;
3.  whether the Aegis test facility in Hawaii should be converted into an operational Aegis Ashore site to provide additional BMD capability for defending Hawaii and the U.S. West Coast;
4.  burden sharing—how European naval contributions to European BMD capabilities and operations compare to U.S. naval contributions to European BMD capabilities and operations;
5.  the potential for ship-based lasers, electromagnetic railguns (EMRGs), and hypervelocity projectiles (HVPs) to contribute in coming years to Navy terminal phase BMD operations and the impact this might eventually have on required numbers of ship-based BMD interceptor missiles;
6.  technical risk and test and evaluation issues in the Aegis BMD program; and
7.  the lack of a target for simulating the endo-atmospheric (i.e., final) phase of flight of China’s DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile.

Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program Congressional Research Service
Continue reading Report – Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Examples Of Before and After Imagery That Can Assist In Response Recovery and Rebuilding Operation Planning and Assessment.

As Hurricane Irma churned through the Caribbean and up Florida’s coast,   satellites have been capturing high-resolution images of the storm’s damage. Imaging in the Caribbean became possible over the weekend as the clouds moved out of the area.

Before-and-after imagery taken between Friday, Sept. 8 and Sept. 11 of several places in the Caribbean: Tortola, Turks and Caicos, St Maarten, Necker Island, Barbuda and Saint Martin. The “after” images were taken by Digital Globe’s WorldView-3, WorldView-2 and GeoEye-1 satellites.

Digital Globe has also publicly released pre- and post-event satellite imagery of the areas affected by Hurricane Irma through our Open Data Program, which provides imagery to support recovery efforts in the wake of large-scale natural disasters. Humanitarian Open Street Map Team (HOT) set up mapping tasks for Irma using Digital Globe imagery in preparation for the storm. Additional tasks will be established once more post-event imagery is available, as will a Tomnod crowd sourcing campaign.

 

Port Barbuda PortBarbudaPost StMaartenPreStMaartenPostPhotos credit to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/Department of Commerce.

Photography Contest for the Midshipmen of the United States Naval Academy

ATI is a supporter and follower of the United States Naval Academy USNA. Several of our instructors are Naval Academy graduates.

The USNA held a photography contest for the midshipmen to highlight their summer training activities around the globe. These are some of the best images. It shows a diversity of places the USNA midshipmen go over their working summer.

http://www.capitalgazette.com/multimedia/photos/cgnews-ac-cn-usna-summer-photo-contest-usna-20170924-pg-photogallery.html

Russian hacker group ‘CyberBerkut’ returns to public light with allegations against Clinton

CyberBerkutCyberBerkutA Twitter account tied to a group that the Defense Intelligence Agency recently described as “Russian hackers … supporting Russia’s military operations” returned to the spotlight Wednesday by posting a message that alleges Ukrainian government officials and businessmen laundered money and sent it to Hillary Clinton by making donations to the Clinton Foundation.

These allegations, a vague and loosely defined set of financial connections described in a single graphic and related blog post, could not be confirmed. The blog post alludes to an inappropriate relationship between Ukrainian billionaire Victor Pinchuk and the Clinton family. But emails that were supposedly stolen and posted in this blog post do not prove that such a conspiracy occurred. An attempt to contact the group went unanswered.

The Tweet posted Wednesday by this “CyberBerkut” group is the first such message posted publicly since January after the account shared an image of a redacted email it claims revealed plans by the U.S. government to doctor evidence to suggest that Russian hackers had interfered in the 2016 U.S. election.

Read More Here.

Russian hacker group ‘CyberBerkut’ returns to public light with allegations against Clinton

CyberBerkut

 

A Twitter account tied to a group that the Defense Intelligence Agency recently described as “Russian hackers … supporting Russia’s military operations” returned to the spotlight Wednesday by posting a message that alleges Ukrainian government officials and businessmen laundered money and sent it to Hillary Clinton by making donations to the Clinton Foundation.

These allegations, a vague and loosely defined set of financial connections described in a single graphic and related blog post, could not be confirmed. The blog post alludes to an inappropriate relationship between Ukrainian billionaire Victor Pinchuk and the Clinton family. But emails that were supposedly stolen and posted in this blog post do not prove that such a conspiracy occurred. An attempt to contact the group went unanswered.

The Tweet posted Wednesday by this “CyberBerkut” group is the first such message posted publicly since January after the account shared an image of a redacted email it claims revealed plans by the U.S. government to doctor evidence to suggest that Russian hackers had interfered in the 2016 U.S. election.

HACKING TRIDENT: A Growing Threat

This 38 page paper reviews the growing potential for cyber-attack on the UK’s operational fleet of Vanguard-class submarines armed with nuclear-tipped Trident II D-5 ballistic missiles, and some of the implications for strategic stability. http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/HACKING%20UK%20TRIDENT.pdf

Malware injection during manufacturing, mid-life refurbishment or software updates and data transmission interception allow potential adversaries to conduct long-term cyber operations. BASIC has already highlighted the future potential for emerging technologies to deliver high confidence in global detection of submarines.1 Future weaponized underwater drones may facilitate close proximity kinetic and cyber-attacks on ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).

The report concludes that the vulnerability to cyber attacks is real. It can be reduced by significant, vigilant and continuous cyber protection, but cannot be eliminated. It is therefore essential that in addition to significant investment in cyber defense, those responsible also need to consider strategies that build resilience within the systems, and to incorporate this threat into broader assessments relevant to the choice of weapon systems, platforms and broader defense and security strategies

For more information on this cyber threat, visit the article: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/hacking-nuclear-submarines-matthew-rosenquist

The Applied Technology Institute (ATI) offers courses in cyber security to help government and private facilities worldwide from learning how to mitigate or prevent such occurrences. Among the courses ATI offers in cyber security is Cyber Leadership Course (CLC) with the following upcoming dates in Hanover, Maryland:

http://www.aticourses.com/Cyber_Leader_Course.htm
September 6–7 2017 and October 1–2 2017.

In addition, ATI offers Tactical Digital Forensics from December 4–15 2017, also in Hanover, MD.

For more information or to view ATI’s schedule of courses, visit aticourses.com or contact us at (410) 956-8805.

Virginia Class Attack Submarine (SSNs) Program Status and Shortfall Report to Congress

Summary of Congressional Research Service Report
The Navy has been procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarines since FY1998. The two Virginia-class boats requested for procurement in FY2017 are to be the 25th and 26 th boats in the class. The 10 Virginia-class boats programmed for procurement in FY2014- FY2018 (two per year for five years) are being procured under a multiyear-procurement (MYP) contract.
From FY2025 to FY2036, the number of SSNs is projected to experience a dip or valley, reaching a minimum of 41 boats (i.e., 25 boats, or about 38%, less than the 66-boat force-level goal) in FY2029. This projected valley is a consequence of having procured a relatively small number of SSNs during the 1990s, in the early years of the post-Cold War era. Some observers are concerned that this projected valley in SSN force levels could lead to a period of heightened operational strain for the SSN force, and perhaps a period of weakened conventional deterrence against potential adversaries.
The Navy has been exploring options for mitigating the projected valley. Procuring additional Virginia-class boats in the near term is one of those options. In that connection, the Navy has expressed interest in procuring an additional Virginia-class boat in FY2021. Congress also has the option of funding the procurement of one or more additional Virginia-class boats in FY2018-FY2020.
For more information attend
Submarines and Submariners 19-Sep-17 21-Sep-18
Jim Jenkins, President

Protecting the Soldier: U.S. Army Orders More Q-53 Counterfire Radars from Lockheed Martin

Lockheed Martin will manufacture additional AN/TPQ-53 counterfire radar systems for the U.S. Army under a $1.6 billion order-dependent contract. The Q-53 radar system supports troops in combat by detecting, classifying, tracking and identifying the location of enemy indirect fire in either 360- or 90-degree modes.

Lockheed Martin completed the 100th Q-53 radar system for the Army in January and is manufacturing multiple Q-53 radar systems per month. Since Lockheed Martin won the development contract for the Q-53 radar in 2007, the company has won five additional contracts for a total of more than 100 radar systems, 95 systems have been delivered to the Army. With this full-rate production contract award, the Army’s complement of Q-53 radar systems will total more than 170.

“The Q-53 system helps troops know what is going on around them in an increasingly complicated world,” said Rick Herodes, director of Lockheed Martin’s Q-53 radar program. “What’s so special about the Q-53 radar system is the inherent flexibility of its software controlled active electronically scanned array (AESA). Our engineers can adjust the Q-53’s software to address emerging threats. Having control in the software allows quick reaction to whatever comes next – so the first Q-53 radar system off the line could be quickly updated to be just as capable as the 170th Q-53 radar system.”

Lockheed Martin is the only company producing active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars for the Army.

Over the last 10 years new threats have emerged including unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Thanks to the flexibility of open architecture designs, simple software modifications can be made to adjust radar systems, including the Q-53 radar, to meet various missions. The U.S. Army awarded Lockheed Martin a $28 million contract in November for “quick reaction capability to add counter-unmanned aerial system to the AN/TPQ-53 radar system” simultaneous with its core counterfire mission.

The Q-53 radar can be readily adapted to provide both air surveillance and counterfire target acquisition in one tactical sensor. The radar system demonstrated its multimission radar (MMR) capability by identifying and tracking aerial systems and passing that information to a command and control node, a key capability as the battlespace rapidly becomes more crowded with emerging air threats.

The Q-53 supports counter-insurgency missions as well as high-intensity combat operations. The system is highly mobile on the battlefield; it can be set up in five minutes, taken down in two minutes and supports two-man operation.

Work on the Q-53 radars is performed at Lockheed Martin facilities in Syracuse and Owego, New York, Moorestown, New Jersey, and Clearwater, Florida.

For additional information, visit our website: www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/tpq53.html

 

​Report to Congress on Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies

 

Contents

Introduction 5

Iran’s Policy Motivators   5

Threat Perception  5

Ideology  6

National Interests  6

Factional Interests and Competition   7

Instruments of Iran’s National Security Strategy  8

Financial and Military Support to Allied Regimes and Groups  8

Other Political Action  11

Diplomacy  11

Iran’s Nuclear and Defense Programs  12

Nuclear Program  12

Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Activities  12

International Diplomatic Efforts to Address Iran’s Nuclear Program 14

Developments during the Obama Administration  15

Missile Programs and Chemical and Biological Weapons Capability 17

Chemical and Biological Weapons 17

Missiles 18

Conventional and “Asymmetric Warfare” Capability 21

Military-Military Relationships and Potential New Arms Buys  21

Asymmetric Warfare Capacity  22

Iran’s Regional and International Activities  25

Near East Region 25

The Persian Gulf 25

Iranian Policy on Iraq, Syria, and the Islamic State  36

Iraq  36

Syria  38

Iran’s Policy toward Israel: Supporting Hamas and Hezbollah 39

Hamas 40

Hezbollah  41

Yemen42

Turkey 43

Egypt 44

South and Central Asia 44

The South Caucasus: Azerbaijan and Armenia 44

Central Asia  45

Turkmenistan 46

Tajikistan 46

Kazakhstan  47

Uzbekistan  47

South Asia 48

Afghanistan 48

Pakistan  49

India  50

Sri Lanka 51

Russia 51

Europe  52

East Asia 53

China  53

Japan and South Korea  54

North Korea 54

Latin America 55

Venezuela 56

Argentina 56

Africa 57

Sudan 58

Prospects and Alternative Scenarios 59

 

Figures

Figure 1. Map of Near East …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 25

Figure 2. Major Persian Gulf Military Facilities ………………………………………………………………… 34

Figure 3. South and Central Asia Region ………………………………………………………………………….. 44

Figure 4. Latin America ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 55

Figure 5. Sudan ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 57

Tables

Table 1. Major Iran or Iran-Related Terrorism Attacks or Plots ……………………………………………. 10

Table 2. Iran’s Missile Arsenal ………………………………………………………………………………………… 20

Table 3. Iran’s Conventional Military Arsenal …………………………………………………………………… 23

Table 4. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) …………………………………………………… 24

Table 5. Military Assets of the Gulf Cooperation Council Member States …………………………….. 35

 

Contacts

Author Contact Information ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 61

 

Iran’s national security policy is the product of many, and sometimes competing, factors: the ideology of Iran’s Islamic revolution; Iranian leadership’s perception of threats to the regime and to the country; long-standing Iranian national interests; and the interaction of the Iranian regime’s various factions and constituencies. Some experts assert that the goal of Iran’s national security strategy is to overturn a power structure in the Middle East that Iran asserts favors the United States and its allies Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni Muslim Arab regimes. Iran characterizes its support for Shiite and other Islamist movements as support for the “oppressed” and asserts that Saudi Arabia, in particular, is instigating sectarian tensions and trying to exclude Iran from regional affairs. Others interpret Iran as primarily attempting to protect itself from U.S. or other efforts to invade or intimidate it or to change its regime. Its strategy might, alternatively or additionally, represent an attempt to enhance Iran’s international prestige or restore a sense of “greatness” reminiscent of the ancient Persian empires. From 2010 until 2016, Iran’s foreign policy also focused on attempting to mitigate the effects of international sanctions on Iran.

Iran employs a number of different tools in pursuing its national security policy. Some Iranian policy tools are common to most countries: traditional diplomacy and the public promotion of Iran’s values and interests. Iran also has financially supported regional politicians and leaders. Of most concern to U.S. policymakers is that Iran provides direct material support to armed groups, some of which use terrorism to intimidate or retaliate against Israel or other regional opponents of Iran. Iran’s armed support to Shiite-dominated allied governments, such as those of Syria and Iraq, also has fueled Sunni popular resentment.

Iran’s national security policy focuses most intently on the Near East region, including on U.S. operations, allies, and activities in that region. It is that region where all the various components of Iran’s foreign policy interact. Iran’s policy also seems to be directed at influencing the policies and actions of big powers, such as those in Europe as well as Russia, that are active in the Near East—either as partners or antagonists of U.S. interests in that region.

Some experts forecast that Iran’s foreign and defense policies would shift after international sanctions were eased in January 2016 in accordance with the July 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). Additional financial resources enable Iran to expand its regional influence further. Others assessed that the nuclear agreement would cause Iran to moderate its regional behavior in order not to jeopardize the agreement and its benefits. During 2016, Obama Administration officials and U.S. reports asserted that there was little, if any, alteration of Iran’s national security policies. On February 1, 2017, the Trump Administration cited Iran’s continued “malign activities” and repeated ballistic missile tests, and asserted that Iran “is now feeling emboldened” and that the Administration was “officially putting Iran on notice.” The Administration subsequently sanctioned additional Iran missile entities under existing authorities and maintained that a “deliberative process” was underway that could result in further actions not contravening the JCPOA. Recent U.S. statements and press reports indicate the Administration might be considering military efforts to set back Iranian influence in Yemen, and perhaps elsewhere.

Iran has used the JCPOA to ease its international diplomatic isolation and to try to develop itself as a regional energy and trade hub and to explore new weapons buys. Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i and key hardline institutions, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), oppose any compromises of Iran’s core goals, but support Iran’s reintegrate into regional and international diplomacy.

View full report here.

First SPY-6(V) Radar BMD Test

An Arleigh Burke class destroyer
An Arleigh Burke class destroyer

Applied Technology Institute (ATI Courses) offers a variety of courses on Radar, Missiles & Defense.  The news below would be of interest to our readers.

The U.S. Navy successfully conducted a flight test March 15 with the AN/SPY-6(V) Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) off the west coast of Hawaii, Naval Sea Systems Command announced in a March 30 release.

During a flight test designated Vigilant Hunter, the AN/SPY-6(V) AMDR searched for, detected and maintained track on a short-range ballistic missile target launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility at Kauai. This is the first in a series of ballistic missile defense flight tests planned for the AN/SPY-6(V) AMDR.

Read more here.